publications
Edited Collections & Special Issues
with Wheeler, M. (Ed.’s)
Heidegger and Cognitive Science
New Directions in Cognitive Science and Philosophy, Palgrave, MacMillan, forthcoming, 2010
with Vierkant, T., and Clark, A. (Ed.’s)
Decomposing the Will
Philosophy of Mind Series, Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2010with Phemister, P. & Basile, P. (Ed’s)
The Metaphysics of Consciousness: Essays in honour of Timothy Sprigge
Philosophy: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, forthcoming, 2010with Clark, A. (Ed.’s)
The Enacted Mind and The Extended Mind
Topoi: an International Review of Philosophy 28.1, 2009
Essays in Anthologies“Sensorimotor knowledge and the contents of experience.”
Gangopdhay, N., Madary, M. & Spicer, F. (Ed’s) Perception, Action and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Dual Vision, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2010
“Heidegger, “mineness”, and temporality.”
Kiverstein & Wheeler (Ed.) Heidegger and Cognitive Science, Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming, 2010
“Wittgenstein, Qualia and the Autonomy of Grammar.”
Zamuner, E. & Levy, D. (Ed.’s) Wittgenstein’s Enduring Arguments, Routledge, 2009
Journal Articles
“The metaphysics of time-consciousness”
The Metaphysics of Consciousness: Essays in honour of Timothy Sprigge, Philosophy: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement,
Kiverstein, J., Phemister, P. & Basile, P. (Ed’s), forthcoming 2010“The minimal sense of self, temporality and the brain.”
Psyche: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness, 2009
(Short-listed essay in Consciousness in the Natural and Cultural Context Essay Award for Junior Scholars)
with Clark, A.
“Mind, Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many.”
Topoi 28., 2009
with Gangopadhay, N
“Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action.”
Topoi 28.1, 2009
“Consciousness, the Minimal Self and Brain.”
Synthesis Philosophica 44, 22.2, 2008
“Bootstrapping the mind.”
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 31: 41-52, 2008
Could a Robot have a Subjective Point of View?
Journal of Consciousness Studies 14.7, 2007 (pp 127-139)An Enactive Theory of Phenomenal Intentionality
Di Nucci, E. & McHugh. C. (Eds.), Content, Consciousness and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. London: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006
Work in Progress
“Impulsive action and the sense of time”
Vierkant, T., Clark, A., and Kiverstein, J. (Ed’s): Decomposing the Will (Oxford University Press, Philosophy of Mind Series, forthcoming 2010)
“Motor intentionality, zombie systems and the bodily self”
Z. Radman (Ed): The Background (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming 2010)Miscellaneous
“Concrete magnitudes: from numbers to time. A commentary on Cohen-Kadosh & Walsh’s “Numerical representation in the parietal lobes: abstract or non-abstract.”
with Falter, C., Norieka, V., & Mölder, B: Behavioural and Brain Sciences 32: 335-6, 2009with Clark, A.
Experience and Agency: Slipping the Mesh
Commentary on Ned Block's "Consciousness Accessibility and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience"
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, 2007
Review of Thomas Metzinger, Being No-One: the Self-Model of Subjectivity
Philosophical Psychology 18.6, 2005Review of Lilian Alweiss, The World Unclaimed: a challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl
Philosophy in Review, April 2004
Art and Science
The Map, Issue 5, Spring 2006
Naturalising Phenomenology: Using Phenomenology to close the Explanatory Gap
PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2005:
Abstract
Introduction
Chapter 1: The Conflict Between Naturalism and Phenomenology
Chapter 2: Existential Phenomenology and the Argument Against Naturalism
Chapter 3: Locating the Explanatory Gap
Chapter 4: Consciousness and Intentionality
Chapter 5: Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and First-Person Knowledge
Chapter 6: Making Room for Subjective Facts
Chapter 7: Naturalising Phenomenology
Bibliography
