

## **Abstract**

Naturalists and Phenomenologists have contrasting conceptions of philosophy and its purpose. The naturalist takes philosophy to be a discipline that is continuous with the natural sciences, while phenomenology defines itself by its opposition to such a view of philosophy. My thesis project argues that this opposition is unfounded.

The phenomenologist takes the world we consciously experience to be a world of subjective facts. My thesis begins by introducing the phenomenologist's conception of a subjective fact. I call a situation "a subjective fact" when it essentially involves a subject of experience. I go on to explain why phenomenologists thought the world we experience is a world of subjective facts.

Naturalists hold that all facts are objective facts, and it is generally supposed that no fact can be both subjective and objective. I argue that it is the contrast between these two kinds of facts that led phenomenologists to conclude that a naturalistic theory of mind will have no place in it for subjective facts.

A central claim in my PhD thesis is that a fact can be both subjective and objective. I argue that a naturalist could accept the existence of subjective facts if s/he could admit the existence of situations that essentially involve relations to subjects of experience. If a naturalist is to accept the existence of situations of this kind, a naturalist account must be given of what it is to be a subject of experience.

A creature becomes a subject of experience, I claim, when it tokens representations with reflexive content. I offer an account of what it is for a representation to have reflexive content in terms of a special kind of representation I call 'an implicit self-representation'. I offer a naturalist account of implicit self-representation by appealing to the role this notion of representations plays in embodied and situated accounts of perception.

I conclude that naturalism can admit into its ontology subjects of experience. The phenomenologist says naturalism must exclude subjective facts with the result that our relation to the world gets misdescribed. I argue that naturalists can admit subjective facts, thereby opening up the possibility of a naturalised phenomenology.